Tactica Guerilla: Irregular Warfare

Blog on Hiatus

2009-01-24T13:20:00.003-05:00

Hello everyone,

It is with deep regret that I must admit that right now I do not think I can keep up with this blog for a while. I have obligations in 'real life' such as it is, that require that I devote more of my time away from Tactica Guerrilla.

So I am putting this on temporary back-burner. I do intend to come back someday, hopefully with a big update, but not in the foreseeable future. It would be irresponsible of me to continue when I really can't, as the quality of writing would go down. Plus it would only add pressure to me, which I can not really afford in my life right now.

I hope you all understand and are willing to wait for my return, gentle readers.

Thank you.

Besieging Wei to save Zhao: Sun Bin and the Battle of Guiling

2009-01-17T17:41:00.004-05:00

Hello again gentle readers, my apologies for no update last week. I was not feeling well at the time.

Anyway for this week’s topic I thought to continue to focus on East Asia for another week before heading back to Europe. What I intend to cover is the historical background for the Chinese idiom “Besieging Wei to save Zhao”. This is a classic example of indirect warfare in action, attacking a enemy stronger then you are in the place he will least expect.

In 354 BC, during China’s tumultuous Warring States Era, the State of Zhao launched a mass invasion of the State of Minor-Wei (so called for it shares the same Romanization with a greater state), forcing it to pay homage. Minor-Wei’s nominal feudal overlord, Wei, was angered by this action. King Hui ordered a single, great, surgical strike directly at the Zhao capital of Handan aiming for a short war that would greatly empower the state.

The other feudal states of China reacted badly to this move, wishing to prevent Wei from being able to re-assert the power that its predecessor, the State of Jin, had been able to assert. The State of Chu, a great southern power, struck Wei at Sui and Hui counties. The State of Qin made their own strike by attempting to humiliate Wei by taking their original homelands in Shaoliang and Anyi counties. But King Hui had been building up a large military machine for Wei, one able to deal with three wars at once.

After a year of siege a beleaguered Zhao sent a desperate plea for aid to its primary ally, the State of Qi. King Wei of Qi was undecided about what to do, and allowed his retainers to argue it out. However in the end it was the advice of General Duan Ganpeng that persuaded the king to act. Duan pointed out that Qi would damage its own reputation by refusing to aid Zhao, and that any Wei success in battle would put Qi a great disadvantage. To remedy this he advanced a three point plan:

1. Attack Sui County, as Chu had done, to fool the Wei forces into thinking that Qi intended to attack their supply lines and primary staging area.

2. Send a dispatch to Handan to let Zhao know that help was on the way.

3. Actually allow Handan to fall and Zhao to teeter on collapse before actually moving.

This allowed Qi to appear as fulfilling its obligations but also to take advantage of the situation. Qi forces were mobilized and a small, but highly skilled, force was sent in to Sui County. After Handan fell the next phase began.

The forces sent for this task was commanded by Prince Tian Ji and his military advisor, Sun Bin (a Wei expatriate and great-grandson of Sunzi). Not long after departing, Sun Bin advanced his plan to rescue Zhao:

1. Peal off a small army led by incompetent commanders to attack Wei at the fortified center of Pingling. This would lure Wei, and its military commander Pang Juan (a classmate of Sun Bin’s), into a false sense of superiority over a ‘blundering’ enemy.

2. Dispatch the light troops and chariots to attack the Wei capital at Daliang directly, thus forcing King Hui to re-call Pang Juan and his forces immediately from Zhao.

3. Post a significant force in hiding to Guiling, which Pan Juan would have to pass through to get back to Daliang, and ambush the Wei forces as they attempted to pass.

Prince Ji took Sun Bin’s advice and set his men into action. At the strategist’s further advice the Prince kept the majority his army in Qi itself, as a mobile reserve. Wei reacted much as Sun Bin predicted, with an already rattled King Hui desperately calling for aid from Pang Juan. Pang, confident in an easy victory, departed for Daliang with only his light troops and mobile elite with him. While the Wei forces marched south Sun Bin took the time to plan out his ambush with care and motivate his men.

As a result when the Wei forces finally did arrive at Guiling they were taken completely by surprise. Suffering both from the after-effects of siege warfare and the quick march south the forces of Pang Juan crumbled under the press of the Qi assault. Sun Bin’s own forces were well-rested and supremely motivated, and effectively rolled over their opponents.

In the chaos the Wei commander was captured and Prince Ji allowed Sun Bin to decide his fate. For the strategist this was opportunity for revenge. Pang Juan and Sun Bin had once been competitors for King Hui’s favor, and Pang won the contest by mutilating and exiling Sun. But strangely Sun Bin allowed Pang Juan to live and sent him back to Wei in disgrace. The campaign had ended in smashing victory for Qi, allowing Zhao to recover and dealing Wei a significant set-back to its military ambitions.

The Mongol Invasions of Vietnam

2009-01-03T13:49:00.004-05:00

Well hello again gentle readers and welcome to the first post of the 2009 edition of Tactica Guerilla. I have had a good holiday, but now it is time to get off my lazy backside and update, as I am sure you all are anxious for.

Anyway today’s topic is a new one for me, the Mongol invasions of what is now Vietnam. Most people would be familiar with the failed invasions of Japan and the myth of the kami kaze (Divine Wind) but what about South East Asia? That is what I intend to cover with this issue.

In 1253 AD the Mongol Empire, among the largest and most militarily successful states in history, entered South East Asia through the conquest of the kingdom of Nanzhao (in modern Yunnan). This was all part of Mongol grand strategy, as the annexation of Nanzhao provided the Mongols with the means to outflank the Chinese Southern Song dynasty. In 1257 the Mongols made their formal introduction to the kingdoms of modern Vietnam when Uriyangqadai (the son of Subadai, among the Mongol’s greatest leaders) led an invasion force through the Kingdom of Dai Viet as part of an assault upon the Song.

The ruling Tran dynasty was rendered helpless by panic, and fled out to sea to take refuge on a distant island. The Viet people, however, waged a guerilla war, taking to the mountains and burning their villages to prevent the Mongols from being able to live off the land. Uriyangqadai, however, was not interested in conquering Dai Viet, and contented himself with the occupation of the capital, Thang Long (modern Hanoi), and the formal submission of the Tran authorities. The Mongols left the following year, in 1258, but this was but a taste of things to come.

Over the course of the following years the situation would change dramatically. In 1260 the Mongols were revitalized by the leadership of the dynamic Qubilai, who soon demanded the submission of the submission of both Vietnamese kingdoms (Dai Viet and Champa), who were forced to accept in the face of overwhelming Mongol might. However this was soon shattered. The newly proclaimed Yuan Empire (1271) was defied by two unlikely states: the Hojo Regency of Japan (1274 and 1281) and the Burmese Kingdom of Bagan (1277). The defeats at both their hands were a humiliation and broke the myth of Mongol invincibility. This encouraged the kings of Dai Viet and Champa and set the stage for further events.

In 1281, even as Yuan armies prepared for the second invasion of Japan, Qubilai Qa’an demanded personal tribute and submission from Champa. The elderly Indravarman V refused and fled the kingdom like the Tran kings of the north for an island. The Crown Prince, Che Man, took charge of the defense. Even as Yuan forces under Sodu, a leading marshal, landed at the capital of Vijaya, the Chams withdrew into the mountains. When the Mongols followed Che Man surprised them with a fierce guerilla war.

Like the Dai Viet in 1257 they burned their own villages, but also used their own techniques. One in particular was the heavy usage of crossbow cavalry and of siege crossbows mounted on elephants. In frustration, Qubilai ordered that Dai Viet to submit to the usage of their country as a highway for a second Yuan army to enter Champa. But the Tran dynasty refused.

The first real invasion of Dai Viet was undertaken in 1284. Hoping that a quick strike would eliminate Dai Viet resistance Qubilai had sent an army south under his son Prince Torghon with neither clear objectives (either military or political) or a supply train. Both of these elements would come back to haunt the invaders. As before Thang Long fell before the whirlwind, but it reaped no benefits. The entire leadership structure of the Dai Viet state had fled with the Tran monarchy.

Military affairs were left in the able hands of General Tran Hung Dao, who made the Yuan occupation a living nightmare. A combination of scorched earth, endless river raids, and the onset of hot heavy rains finally drove the Yuan out. In the last phase of the occupation the general Sodu, marching north from Champa and unaware of the withdrawal, was slain in pitched battle at Siming in 1285. The Mongols had been beaten back.

But Qubilai would not accept this. Now more obsessed with Vietnam then anything else, Qubilai put on hold plans for a third invasion of Japan to conquer Dai Viet and Champa completely. In 1286 Yuan armies re-entered Dai Viet. Having seemingly learned the lessons of the previous invasion they advanced more slowly and methodically, using combined land and sea forces to keep in supply while reducing the border forts. In 1287 Prince Torghon captured Thang Long, but as before the Tran monarchy and their court had escaped. When the Dai Viet struck back along the flood plains of the Red River Torghon withdrew.

He returned in 1288, during the hot season. Tran Hung Dao took advantage of the Yuan leadership’s ineptitude to strike back on land and sea. With the fall of the fortress of Dai Than to Vietnamese guerillas and the loss of the entire supply fleet at Van Don the Yuan chose to withdraw a second time. But Tran Hung Dao was not willing to allow them to leave. At the estuary of the Bach Dang River, near modern Haiphong, he saw his chance. Hoping to repeat the success of Ngo Quyen against the Southern Han in 939, Tran had his men line the bed of the river with short wooden poles topped with iron points. He then sent his numerically inferior navy to lure the Yuan ships into the river mouth at high tide.

When the tide receded the ships became stuck and the Dai Viet forces swarmed over them, massacring the Yuan forces. Torghon retreated in disgrace and the Mongols would not return. Dai Viet and Champa would both resume sending tribute to Dadu, the Yuan capital, but from a position of strength instead of weakness.

Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator and the defeat of Hannibal

2008-12-20T19:02:00.007-05:00

In the annals of history one man more then any other is accorded the credit for the defeat of the Carthaginian master general Hannibal during the epochal Second Punic War: P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus. While Scipio does indeed deserve his laurels as one of history’s most brilliant commanders he alone was not the reason for Hannibal’s defeat. Often forgotten is another commander, of a different kind of genius, Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator. This man’s strategy is the one I intend to cover this week.

First off apologies to you, my readers who have had to wait until nearly the end of the week to see this blog updated. I have been sidetracked by my excitement over the coming Christmas holiday, which is why my next update will be the week after this coming week. Because I know my excitement will only increase.

The Early Days

The Fabian Strategy was adopted by the Roman Republic in the aftermath of the twin disasters at Trebbia (218) and Lake Trasimene (217) where the invading Carthaginian forces of Hannibal defeated Rome handily. In answer the Roman Senate declared an emergency and appointed the senior conservative leader, Q. Fabius Maximus, to the post of Dictator for 6 months.

Fabius knew that Hannibal could not be defeated by conventional means or in a pitched battle like what Rome was used too. So he adopted an indirect strategy aimed at two goals: To deny the Carthaginian ability to re-supply by cutting their supply lines and practicing a Scorched Earth policy. And secondly to keep Rome’s Italic allies from defecting to Carthage.

The Fabian Strategy

The Dictator put his plans into action quickly but knew that it would take time and patience for the strategy to start showing results. Fabius never engaged Hannibal directly and when in one instance at Gerunium the impetuosity of his officers resulted in a near-battle the Dictator successfully pulled out before more troops became engaged. Fabius always acted through small, highly mobile, groups of light infantry or cavalry. This frustrated Hannibal’s attempts to tie Fabius down for battle.

By managing to hit the Carthaginian rear and largely undefended supply bases far more quickly then Hannibal could react the situation escalated. Fabius then upped the ante by building fortified posts in the Italian countryside where the local farmers could hide their foodstuffs and livestock from Carthaginian forage parties. The Dictator was well aware that Hannibal could not afford a siege of any kind as the majority of his forces were mercenary in nature. They would not endure a siege for long, no matter how small the target. This new tactic had the added plus for the Romans of further tightening the Carthaginian supply lines.

The adoption of Scorched Earth followed. Fabius took his indirect approach to the next level by burning any and all resources that could be used by Hannibal. While a widely unpopular move in what was becoming an unpopular war, it did work. The Carthaginian forces were becoming increasing desperate for supplies and the plunder necessary to keep the mercenary component happy.

This in turn served to keep the Italic allies from defecting. As long as he could deny Hannibal the battle he desired, the Dictator knew he could keep the possibility of a Carthaginian victory low in the minds of Rome's Italic allies. Those allies could determine the course of the war, and Fabius was determined to keep them in the Roman camp.

Rejection of the Fabian Strategy and Cannae

However the political situation in Rome would soon bring Fabius’ hard work to an end. The people and the younger members of the Roman Senate did not understand that patience was needed to defeat Hannibal and the Dictator, derisively nicknamed Cunctator (the Delayer), was removed at the end of his term in 216 B.C. The two new Consuls for that year, C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus, were given the task of fighting the decisive battle with Hannibal.

At Cannae Rome suffered the worst military defeat in the history of the Republic, and the one of the worst in the entire history of the Roman State. The decisive battle for which Fabius’ had been ousted was a massive failure. The following year the Roman people returned to Q. Fabius Maximus and returned to power as Consul, and his strategy was put back into effect.

The Fabian Strategy Resumed and the War's End

In charge once again, Fabius went to work against Hannibal. Now willing to be more patient the Roman people and the Senate gave the ‘Cunctator’ (now a title of respect) more latitude. This coincided with a general resurgence in Roman military activity and it bore fruit. Through many long years across Italy and the Mediterranean area on a whole the tide turned against Carthage.

In 203 Hannibal was forced to evacuate the Italian Peninsula, but by that time the architect of his defeat in Italy had died earlier in the year. The Second Punic War would be brought to an end the following year when the great Scipio Africanus, the only man to equal him on the field, defeated the great general on the fields of Zama.

Covadonga: The Christian Resistance to the Umayyad Conquest of Spain and the importance of terrain in War

2008-12-08T16:08:00.004-05:00

For today’s update I thought it would a good idea to cover the Battle of Covadonga or Cova Dominica (the Cave of Our Lady) as a good example of what I think is a good lesson on the importance of terrain in warfare. At Covadonga a vastly inferior force of Visigoths and Astures (a native Iberian people) used the mountainous terrain around them to defeat a much larger force dispatched by the local Umayyad authorities in AD 722.

Background and the Early Resistance:

In 711 a mostly mounted Berber raiding force from North Africa led by Tariq ibn Ziyad encountered and destroyed the army of the Visigothic King Roderik along with all of his greatest nobles at Guadalete. The Visigothic Kingdom of Hispania, racked by civil war and domestic problems for the past several decades, collapsed upon itself. By the following year the entire region was under Islamic control by a mixture of military force and the Visigoth nobility’s own willingness to work with the new Umayyad authorities.

One such noble was Pelagius, now known by the Spanish from of his name, Don Pelayo. Pelagius was dux (or Duke) of the difficult region of Asturias in the far north of Hispania. Asturias was home of the difficult Astur clans, who while Romanized maintained their own traditions and independent streak. When news arrived of Roderik’s death in battle he submitted to Umayyad authority but secretly began to accept refugees once the persecutions began.

But outright rebellion did not occur until years later, in 718. The exact circumstances of Pelagius’ rebellion are unclear, but probably are a mixture of factors. Tradition states that one factor was the suicide of his sister Ermesinde, who Pelagius had wed to the local Muslim functionary Munuza, on the night of her wedding. In any case Pelagius’ uprising soon caused the local authorities a headache.

Islamic troops could enter Asturias at will but could not track down or fight Pelagius’ quick moving guerrilla forces. Just as they think they had him, the Visigoth would melt into the mountains where they could not follow. The rebellion gained steam when a neighboring lord joined Pelagius in Asturias. But little attention was paid to the Asturian Rebellion as greater conquests were occurring over the Pyrenees Mountains in Gaul as Umayyad forces overran the Kingdom of Gallia and appeared poised to overrun the Western Franks in Aquitaine as well

But the Muslims were in for a surprise. On June 9^th, 721 the Western Franks of dux Odo the Great surrounded and destroyed the Muslim forces at Tolosa (modern Toulouse) and the governor-general of al-Andalus (the Arabic name for Hispania) died from his wounds. The new governor-general, al-Kalbi, raised excessive taxes to cover the extensive losses suffered in Gaul. The taxes drove the population into rebellion, and Pelagius became bold enough to strike outside of Asturias itself. The authorities realized that something had to be done and planned to make an example of Pelagius, sending an expedition to defeat him under the Berber general al-Qama.

The Battle itself:

Pelagius reacted quickly. While probably not expecting to be confronted directly by the Umayyads the rebellion, as it did before, retreated into the mountain ranges of Asturias as al-Qama’s army, numbering 800 in all, entered the province. Pelagius refused to fight unless it was on ground and in circumstances of his own choosing and he led his pursuers through a series of mountain valleys before arriving at a large cave, now known as Covadonga. While waiting for the Muslims to arrive he divided his meager forces, putting his personal retinue or comitatus, inside the cave itself with putting the rest on the slopes of the valley.

As the Umayyad forces entered the area, their numerical advantage nullified by the small space in which to fight, the Astures on the slopes opened fire with arrows and other missiles. The Muslims quickly became bunched up in their panic, unwilling to enter the caves and unable to go backward. At the decisive moment, as the chaos reached its peak and al-Qama himself had arrived in the valley, the Visigoths in the cave burst from cover.

With their heavy armor an advantage in such close quarters the Visigoths slaughtered the bunched Arabs and Berbers. Once al-Qama fell the Muslim forces fled, and Pelagius harried them straight out of Asturias. The Muslim force was still mostly intact, as they were unable to deploy in full in the mountains, but Pelagius had chosen his ground and the circumstances well. He did not need to destroy them as in a conventional battle. Just discourage them. For his own part Pelagius suffered losses that would have been fatal in other circumstances. Of his estimated 300 men, only 30 survived.

Aftermath

The battle, despite its small size, was just enough. While Muslim chronicles refer to Pelagius as a wild donkey his victory would have long lasting repercussions. The population of Asturias rose in revolt and cast out the remaining Umayyad garrisons. Other Christian nobles soon joined his banner and elected him King. The Reconquista had begun.

First Post and Introduction to the Blog

2008-12-02T08:22:00.001-05:00

Greetings and welcome,

My name is Shogun 144 and this is my blog, Tactica Guerilla: Irregular Warfare. I am a freelance writer and Christian Homeschool graduate. Some of you may know me from my work on Wildfire Games' freeware RTS 0 AD.

As you can probably guess the main aim of this blog is going to be covering irregular military forces throughout history. I am not going to comment on current examples of these kinds of forces and their wars, such as the current American efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq for example. This blog is first and foremost a history blog, as I love history and wish to write about it.

I will also try to keep out any politics from my postings. I am interested in the truth, not political spin. This may upset some people when the facts contradict said political spin but bear with me. You will be better informed for it.

I accept any valid (that is constructive) criticism on my future postings since I am interested in improving my own knowledge of historical events. I also wish to beg my reader's indulgence right here at the beginning in case I should swerve off my stated topic in order to post about something else like Ancient Greece, the Dark Ages, and Feudal Japan.

On how often I intend to post and keep this blog updated, it will be on a weekly basis if at all possible. This is my first blog so I am going to be experimenting. I ask my readers to bear with me as I figure this out.

Now I will close this introduction with a dedication:

I dedicate this blog to my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, without Him my talent and love for writing would not exist. I also dedicate this blog to my parents, whose support, patience, and love has helped me immensely along my path in life.